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COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
Shima Baradaran Baughman

∗

Spending on U.S. incarceration has increased dramatically over the last
several decades. Much of this cost is on incarcerating pretrial detainees—
inmates not convicted of a crime—which constitute the majority of
individuals in our nation’s jails. Current statutory schemes give judges
almost complete discretion to order pretrial detention based on unexplained
or unidentified factors. With this discretion, judges tend to make
inconsistent decisions in every jurisdiction, some releasing almost all
defendants—including the most dangerous—and others detaining most
defendants—even those who are safe to release. There are constitutional
and moral reasons to evaluate our current detention scheme, but even the
fiscal impact of pretrial detention alone calls for an empirical analysis.
Although legal scholarship has applied cost-benefit analysis to other areas
of criminal law, this Article is the first attempt at conducting such analysis
in the pretrial arena. This Article compares the risk posed by each
defendant and the cost of any crimes they may potentially commit while
released with the costs incurred by detaining these defendants. The results
show that relying on the cost-benefit model provided here, judges could
bring significant savings—approximately $78 Billion, increased safety, and
potentially more equitable pretrial detention decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, the amount of money expended on the
administration of the criminal justice system has skyrocketed.1 In particular,

Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. The author appreciates work
on this article by James Parry Sanders, Alexandra Mareshcal, and Alexander Williams. I
am also thankful to Frank McIntyre for the underlying econometric work relied on in this
article.
1
William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
781, 783–84 (2006) (stating that “[s]pending on the adjudication process has risen a great
deal” in the “past generation”).
∗
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spending on prisons has increased dramatically.2 According to one study,
spending on corrections from 1971 to 2002 rose 455%, adjusted for
inflation.3 Institutions of higher learning and prisons compete for limited
state funds, and prisons often win.4 In California, for instance, 10% of the
state general fund went to higher education and 3% went to prisons thirty
years ago, today 11% goes to prisons and 7.5% to higher education;5 perinmate spending in the state is $48,214, compared with per-student
spending of $7,463.6 And overall, this nation spends an estimated $80
billion per year on incarceration.
However, not all of the incarceration costs are for prisoners. Rather,
much of it goes toward housing pretrial detainees—individuals held without
bail based on some perceived level of dangerousness or flight risk—who
now make up the majority of detainees nationwide.7 Historically, many
inmates enjoyed the constitutional right to release before trial.8 But as the
law has evolved in this area, judges have been charged with deciding which
defendants can be safely released and which should be held in jail before
trial.9 The current balancing process that judges use to make pretrial release
and detention decisions is full of individual biases and ad-hoc heuristics that

2

Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, Predicting Violence. 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 551
(2012).
3
Stuntz, supra note 1, at 784 n. 12 (“From 1972 to 2001, spending on corrections rose
455% in constant dollars.”).
4
David Browdin, How High Prison Costs Slash Education and Hurt the Economy,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 24, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/
economic-intelligence/2012/05/24/how-high-prison-costs-slash-education-and-hurt-theeconomy (“With state revenues under pressure and prison budgets off-limits, funds for
higher education have been slashed.”).
5
Id. (“Thirty years ago, 10 percent of the general fund went to higher education and
only 3 percent went to prisons. Today, almost 11 percent goes to prisons and only 7.5
percent goes to higher education.”).
6
Brian Resnick, Chart: One Year of Prison Costs More Than One Year at Princeton,
THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/11/chartone-year-of-prison-costs-more-than-one-year-at-princeton/247629 (comparing spending on
prisons vs. spending on higher education in New Jersey).
7
Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 551
(2012) (“In 1990, the percentage of pretrial detainees was about 50%, but in 2007, the
pretrial detainee population increased to 62% of the jail population.”).
8
Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 723,
768–69 (2011).
9
Baradaran, supra note 7, at 499 (discussing the types of selectivity bias inherent in
the pretrial risk assessment performed by judges).
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make these decisions unpredictable. 10 This is evidenced by the
inconsistency in pretrial release rates across counties in the United States––
some judges release less than 5% of defendants, whereas others release
more than 90% of defendants charged with exactly the same types of crimes
in similar neighborhoods.11 The amount spent on pretrial detention—and
the inconsistent decisionmaking processes from which those costs stem—
require consideration.
In this Article, I explore the potential value of a cost-based method of
pretrial detention decisionmaking. In its simplest form, cost-benefit analysis
is a means of converting the losses and gains of two different courses of
action into quantifiable dollar terms and aggregating to determine total
gains and losses to society.12 It is an examination of the factors that weigh
in favor of or against choosing between the two courses of action—with the
end goal of deciding which course, as a matter of policy, will garner the
greatest net benefit.13 Relying on my own research and on data aggregated
from prior studies, I first quantify the total costs and benefits—both
financial and social—of pretrial detention of those accused of various
crimes, and then compare those to the costs and benefits of pretrial release.
Next, with the understanding that it is likely unrealistic to achieve the
optimum pretrial detention policy (detaining only those individuals for
whom detention produces a net benefit to society), I use this same data to
identify characteristics of felony criminal defendants that most accurately
predict whether a judge should detain or release a particular defendant
pretrial. I ultimately find that with violent crime, economic savings are
greatest when a relatively low number of defendants—those statistically
most likely to pose a danger to society—are detained pretrial. I further find
that adopting such an approach could yield a savings of $78 billion as
compared to the current approach of leaving it up to the subjective
evaluation of judges. At a minimum, I suggest that federal and state courts
should consider a cost-benefit approach to pretrial detention
10

Id. at 525–26 (“Congress and state legislatures charged judges with the task of
predicting who could be safely released and who should be held in jail before trial.”).
11
Id. at 540, fig. 5 (showing the percentage of jurisdictions–counties in a given year–
that have the given release rate for pretrial detainees).
12
See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 2, 12–18 (2006) (discussing the cost-benefit analysis concept in detail).
13
See David L. Weimer & Aidan R. Vining, Assessing the Costs and Benefits of
Social Policies, in INVESTING IN THE DISADVANTAGED 2 (David L. Weimer & Aidan R.
Vining, ed., 2009) (stating that cost-benefit analysis “provides a framework for
comprehensively taking account of a full range of social benefits and costs” and is a tool
for suggesting new policy as well as changes to existing policy).
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decisionmaking as they seek out ways to increase efficiency in the criminal
justice system and reduce budget expenditures overall.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the costs inherent in the
decision to either detain or release a defendant pretrial. Part II presents the
empirical model used to determine the net costs and benefits of both pretrial
detention and release and then determines the factors most predictive of cost
savings to society. Part III offers critiques and limitations of the
methodology. And the final section explains that if judges considered the
risk of pretrial violent crime, they could release more people pretrial with a
substantial savings in costs nationwide. It concludes that a cost-benefit
analysis of pretrial detention reveals that if judges nationally followed the
model described here, they could save approximately $78 Billion and
release individuals who pose less of a risk to society.
I. COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND RELEASE
An important consideration in pretrial detention or release is the costs
and benefits—economic and social—that result in these decisions. When a
judge chooses to detain an individual, that individual bears direct costs and
inconvenience associated with detention.14 The detainee’s family, employer,
government, and the detention center bear costs as well (societal costs).15
Conversely, when a judge chooses to release a defendant prior to trial, she
subjects the public to costs with that release—primarily in the form of
defendants who may commit further crimes.16 In this Part, I enumerate the
various costs that warrant consideration in the cost-benefit analysis. This
explanatory section is not intended to be inclusive. Rather, the costs noted
are intended to be indicative of the types of costs that appear in the costbenefit analysis that follows in Section II.

14

Thomas Bak, Pretrial Release Behavior of Defendants Whom the U.S. Attorney
Wished to Detain, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 45, 65 (2002) (discussing the types of losses a
pretrial detainee will incur while incarcerated).
15
See JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES,
2001, at 1–9 (2004) (detailing state expenditures on prison inmates); see NATIONAL
HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, INCARCERATION AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS:
A FACT SHEET (2010) (discussing the negative consequences of incarceration on family
relationships).
16
See TED R. MILLER, MARK A. COHEN, AND BRIAN WIERSEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW
LOOK 9–17 (1996) (discussing the tangible and intangible losses incurred by victims of
crime).
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A. Costs of Pretrial Detention
1. Costs to Detainees
Pretrial detention imposes direct economic costs on detainees. A
detainee’s inability to work causes the loss of income and, potentially, the
loss of employment and property.17 If pretrial detainees lose employment,
they often simultaneously encounter reduced wages if and when they find
new employment, as serving time reduces hourly wages for men by
approximately 11%, annual employment by nine weeks, and annual
earnings by 40%.18 Furthermore, when property (either apartments or rented
homes) is lost, as occurs in 23% of cases,19 extra funds are expended on a
subsequent housing search. In addition, one-third of detainees report having
their property stolen upon detention and thereafter,20 which amounts to
about $370 per incident of larceny.21
In addition to direct economic costs, detention imposes significant yet
difficult-to-quantify costs on individuals including those associated with the
loss of liberty, dignity, damaged reputation and standing in the
community, 22 and disruptions to family life and other relationships. 23

17

Bak, supra note 14, at 65 (“The price to the defendant of pretrial incarceration is
clearly his or her loss of freedom, loss of income from work which can no longer be
performed.”).
18
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11, 2010, http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/
pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf (“When age, education, school enrollment, region
of residence and urban residence are statistically accounted for, past incarceration reduced
subsequent wages by 11 percent, cut annual employment by nine weeks and reduced yearly
earnings by 40 percent.”).
19
Mark Pogrebin, Mary Dodge, & Paul Katsampes, The Collateral Costs of ShortTerm Jail Incarceration: The Long-Term Social and Economic Disruptions, 5
CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY 64-65 (2001).
20
See Ian O’Donnell, Prisons and Penal Purpose: Measuring ‘Performance’ in
English Jails, 8 Crim. L. F. 111, 118 (1997) (book review) (stating that one in three
inmates had been threatened or had property stolen).
21
TED R. MILLER, MARK A. COHEN, AND BRIAN WIERSEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW
LOOK 9, tbl.2 (1996) (indicating the dollar costs associated with various incidents that
occur in prisons).
22
Pogrebin, et al., supra note 19.
23
See NATIONAL HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, INCARCERATION AND
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: A FACT SHEET (2010) (presenting research on the factors that
strain family relationships when one partner is incarcerated).
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Detainees are often victims of humiliation, rape,24 and other violent acts
while incarcerated, and also suffer added anxiety, stress, and a lower quality
of life as a result.25 All told, the value of lost freedom to pretrial detainees
may be as high as $6,770 for the least dangerous defendants.26
2. Costs to Society
Society’s highest direct cost associated with pretrial detention is the cost
of imprisonment, including facilities maintenance, prison staff and
administration officials, meals, rehabilitation and education programs, etc.
One study has estimated that the annual cost to detain one inmate is
$22,650,27 although individual states, most notably California, spend more
than twice as much on imprisonment.28 Other monetary costs to society
include a reduction in GDP from wages that the defendant would have
otherwise earned29 as well as lost tax revenue.30 Society also bears the
24

See ALLEN J. BECK, PAIGE M. HARRISON, MARCUS BERZOFSKY, RACHEL CASPAR,
& CHRISTOPHER KREBS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN
PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008-09, at 7-8 (2010) http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf (reporting sexual victimization in prisons from inmate
surveys in 2008 to 2009).
25
Pogrebin, et al., supra note19, at 69; see Katherine Nesbitt, Preventative Detention
of Terrorist Suspects in Australia and the United States: A Comparative Constitutional
Analysis, 17 B. U. PUB. INT. L. J. 39, 39-98 (2007) (examining the intrusion of preventative
detention in the United States on personal liberties); Miller, supra note 20 (researchers
have estimated the monetary cost of each rape to be $87,000).
26
David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom:
Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750, 751 (2011) (To
calculate the value to defendants of lost freedom, Abrams & Rohlfs applied the concept of
revealed preference to defendants’ bail-posting decisions; that is, when a defendant posts
bail at a certain amount, the researchers implicitly assume that the benefits of freedom
exceed the cost of posting that amount, and assign a value accordingly. The same
researchers also estimate that the typical defendant is willing to pay $1,000 for ninety days
of freedom.).
27
STEPHAN, supra note 15, at 2.
28
Resnick, supra note 6.
29
Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster, & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really
Matter? The Empirical and Legal Cause for the Right to Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1719, 1763 (2002) (“During pretrial incarceration, detainee’s loss of freedom results
in many losing jobs and homes. Taxpayers are left to pay the rising costs of detention,
while absorbing the social and financial impact of newly dislocated family members.”); See
generally Albert W. Alschuler, Preventative Pretrial Detention and the Failure of InterestBalancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 517 (1986) (“The jobs of
detained defendants frequently disappear, and friendships and family relationships are
disrupted.”).
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expenses incurred to administer court proceedings and the cost of providing
counsel for indigent defendants.31
There are also indirect costs to society associated with pretrial detention.
For example, because pretrial detention often deprives the detainees’
children of financial and emotional support,32 these children are much more
likely to develop anti-social behaviors and engage in future criminal activity
themselves.33 They are likewise significantly more likely to drop out of
school, at a long-term cost of at least $260,000 per child.34 And given that
these children are more likely to receive public assistance, cost shifting is
further enhanced.35
Pretrial detention also carries more indefinite, less-easily quantifiable
costs. Although it may be difficult to monetize the impact of costs like
unexplained pretrial detention decisions on the presumption of innocence,36
it would appear that these costs nonetheless belong in the analysis.
B. Costs of Pretrial Release
As compared to pretrial detention, pretrial release generates relatively
minimal direct costs. For example, in the federal system, pretrial release
programs cost $3,100 to $4,600 per defendant, depending upon the degree

30

On average, incarceration results in $4960 and $1205 in lost federal and state tax
revenue, respectively. Loren A.N. Buddress, Federal Probation and Pretrial Services—A
Cost-Effective and Successful Community Corrections System, 61 FED. PROB. 5, 10 (1997).
31
William A. Brockett, Jr., Presumed Guilty: The Pre-Trial Detainee, 1 YALE REV. L.
& SOC. ACTION 10, 18 (1970) (explaining that the appointment of Public Defenders for pretrial detainees is “another financial burden . . . placed on the state”).
32
Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial
Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1974 (2005) (“Children may suffer from both the
absence of a detained parent, and from neglect from other family members who may be
forced to spread their attention more widely or work to make ends meet.”).
33
Pogrebin, et al., supra note 19, at 66; see also John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer,
Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26
CRIME & JUST.: REV. OF RES. 121, 121–29 (1999) (discussing the various challenges and
issues that the children of detained parents face); JEREMY TRAVIS, ET AL., FAMILIES LEFT
BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 2 (2005) (arguing that	
  
“parental separation due to imprisonment can have profound consequences for children”).
34
JASON AMOS, ALL. FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., DROPOUTS, DIPLOMAS, AND DOLLARS:
U.S. HIGH SCHOOLS AND THE NATION’S ECONOMY 2 (2008), http://all4ed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/08/Econ2008.pdf.
35
Pogrebin et al., supra note 19, at 66; Manns, supra note 32, at 1974.
36
Manns, supra note 32, at 1971–72 (stating that detainees face many different types
of cost, some of which are incalculable).
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of flight risk and comparative dangerousness of the defendant. 37 These
estimates account for the costs of supervision, alternative residential
arrangements or treatment programs, and the cost of recovering defendants
who have fled the jurisdiction. The amount of budget funds apportioned to
these programs can be unusually small, yet highly effective; one
municipality with a population of 50,000 has a fully functioning pretrial
release program supported by an annual operating budget of $19,880.38
Thus, pretrial release in the majority of cases would clearly result in
substantially enhanced direct-cost savings to state and federal budgets.
However, the decision to release a defendant pretrial gives rise to other
costs, which, though indirect, are nonetheless borne by society. Foremost
among these are the costs that come from releasing defendants who
reoffend during the interim period between release and resolution of their
cases. That is, there are costs of crimes that would not have been committed
but for the pretrial release of dangerous defendants.39 When defendants that
are granted pretrial release go on to commit crimes, there is a concomitant
increase in law enforcement costs, court costs, and the costs borne by
victims.40 Crime also imposes further costs on society, such as reduced
housing prices,41 and reduction in local business activity.42 Table 1 below
provides a comprehensive estimate of the unit cost to society for individual
crimes.
37

Marie VanNostrand & Geena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal
Court, 73 FED. PROB. 2, 6 (2009).
38
Melinda Tanner et al., Evaluating Pretrial Services Programs in North Carolina,
72 FED. PROB. 18, 19–20 (2008).
39
Manns, supra note 32, at 1968; see also Bak, supra note 1417, at 64–65 (discussing
the various costs associated with the release of prisoners).
40
Manns, supra note 32 at 1968; see also Andrew W. Bogue & Thomas G. Fritz, The
Six-Man Jury, 17 S.D. L. REV. 285, 288–90 (1972) (discussing the cost of jury trials in
South Dakota); Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the
Consequences for Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159, 159–60, 168–69 (1999) (analyzing
the cost of crime and its effect on cities); Benjamin Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of
Justice, 56 A.B.A. J. 950, 950–51 (1970) (discussing costs associated with jury trials); see
generally THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990-2004: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
STATE COURTS (2007) (discussing the effects and costs of pretrial release for felony
defendants).
41
Ralph B. Taylor, The Impact of Crime on Communities, 539 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 28, 37 (1995) (stating that an increase in violent crime lowered home
values in various areas).
42
See, e.g., Robert T. Greenbaum & George E. Tita, The Impact of Violence Surges
on Neighbourhood Business Activity, 41 URB. STUD. 2495 (2004); Wesley Skogan, Fear of
Crime and Neighborhood Change, 8 CRIME & JUST. 203, 204, 222 (1986).

8

Forthcoming in BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017

Table 1. Total Per-Offense Cost for Different Crimes in 2014 dollars43
Type of offense
Murder
Rape/sexual assault
Aggravated assault
Robbery
Arson
Motor vehicle theft
Stolen property
Household burglary
Embezzlement
Forgery and
counterfeiting
Fraud
Vandalism
Larceny/theft

Tangible cost
($)
1,420,857
45,608
21,528
23,630
18,164
11,646
8,816
6,820
6,059

Intangible cost
($)
9,333,475
220,724
105,057
24,959
5,675
290
N/A
355
N/A

Total cost ($)

5,821
5,563
5,373
3,895

N/A
N/A
N/A
11

5,821
5,563
5,373
3,906

10,754,332
266,332
126,585
48,589
23,839
11,936
8,816
7,175
6,059

II. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION DECISIONS IN
FELONY ARREST CASES
Cost-benefit analysis allows a consideration of whether decisions are
efficient and how well empirical data is being followed. By drawing on
various estimates presented in previous sections of this Article, and by
relying on data from my previous work estimating the probabilities
43

See Kathryn E. McCollister et al., The Cost of Crime to Society: New CrimeSpecific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 98, 104 tbls.3 & 4 (2010). The dollar values have been adjusted for inflation
to reflect the value of 2014 dollars.
The study identifies four main categories of costs resulting from crime: (1) victim
costs, covering direct economic losses, such as health care costs, lost earnings, and
property losses; (2) criminal justice system costs, including government expenditures on
police protection, legal services, and corrections; (3) crime career costs, which estimate the
opportunity costs incurred by the choice to forego legal activities; and (4) intangible costs,
which estimates the indirect societal costs suffered by victims, such as pain and suffering,
stress, and a lower quality life. Id.
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associated with criminal behavior during pretrial release,44 I demonstrate
below that 28% fewer defendants could have been detained pretrial over the
past decade without statistical risk to the public. Furthermore, this reduction
in detentions would have saved defendants and society an estimated $78
billion.
The first subsection estimates the economic benefits to society of
pretrial detention, while the second estimates the economic costs.
Subsection C compares the results of the two preceding subsections and
makes assessments as to the types of individuals for which, empirically, it
would be more cost effective to either release or detain pretrial.
A. Estimating the Costs Avoided Through Pretrial Detention
The benefits of pretrial detention include avoiding (1) the costs
associated with prosecuted crimes committed during the interim period
between release and trial, (2) failures to appear, (3) felonies for which no
arrest is made, and (4) the cost of monitoring a released individual. I rely on
estimates by other scholars for each of these costs. Table 2 below lists
estimates for the potentially avoidable costs associated with each type of
crime and the sources from which I derived each estimate.
To estimate the rate of re-arrest prior to trial, I used Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) data from 134,767 randomly selected felony arrest cases
between 1990 and 2006. The BJS regularly collects information on felony
arrestees in the nation’s seventy-five largest counties, reporting information
on each defendant’s demographic characteristics, the type of offense, status
in the criminal justice system at the time of arrest, criminal history, bail and
pretrial release, court appearance record, and rearrests while on pretrial
release.45

44

See generally Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 7, at 557–58 (analyzing and
discussing the most common predictive factors of pretrial violence, as well as the effect
they have on prisoner detention and release).
45
Data Collection: State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS), BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=282#Publications_and_
products (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). This data is also known as State Court Processing
Statistics (SCPS).
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Table 2. Economic Benefits of Detention46	
  
Benefits per incident in $
Description

Low Estimate ($)

High Estimate
($)

Violent crimes avoided
Murder

4,602,32647

18,780,12048

136,19149

488,24350

Assault

14,71551

158,25052

Robbery

12,52353

364,89854

Other

75,45355

426,57156

Motor vehicle theft

5,94957

19,29958

Forgery

5,73159

10,43960

Rape

Property crimes avoided

46

Note that the dollar values of each estimate from each respective source have been
adjusted for inflation to reflect the value of 2014 dollars.
47
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
48
Matt DeLisi et al., Murder by Numbers: Monetary Costs Imposed by a Sample of
Homicide Offenders, 21 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 501, 506 (2010). AW
49
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
50
DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.
51
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
52
DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.
53
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
54
DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.
55
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
56
DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.
57
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
58
Jeffrey A. Butts & John K. Roman, Juvenile Crime Interventions, in INVESTING IN
THE DISADVANTAGED: ASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SOCIAL POLICIES 103
(David L. Weimer & Aidan R. Vining eds., 2009).
59
McCollister, et al., supra note 43, at 104 tbls.3 & 4.
60
Butts & Roman, supra note 58.
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Fraud

3,95061

5,47862

Burglary

2,19263

44,87564

Larceny

58065

3,83966

3,95067

10,43968

73069

73070

3471

3472

18,66173

33,85874

Weapons

3,09475

3,09476

Other

6,55477

6,55478

40979

51880

Other
Drug crimes avoided
Sales
Possession/Other
Public order crimes avoided
Driving-related

Avoidance of failure to
61

Mark A. Cohen & Alex R. Piquero, New Evidence on the Monetary Value of Saving
a High Risk Youth, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 25, 33 tbl.5 (2009).
62
McCollister, et al., supra note 43, at 104 tbls.3 & 4.
63
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
64
DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.
65
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
66
McCollister, et al., supra note 43, at 104 tbls.3 & 4.
67
DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.
68
Id.
69
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. & OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL
POLICY, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992-2002 (2004).
70
Id.
71
Andrew S. Rajkumar & Michael T. French, Drug Abuse, Crime Costs, and the
Economic Benefits of Treatment, 13 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 291, 308 tbl.III
(1997).
72
Id.
73
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
74
Cohen & Piquero, supra note 61, at 33 tbl.5.
75
JOHN ROMAN & AARON CHALFIN, URBAN INST., DOES IT PAY TO INVEST IN
REENTRY PROGRAMS FOR JAIL INMATES? 16 tbl.10 (2006),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/roman_chalfin.pdf.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 26, at 767.
80
Id.
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appear
Avoidance of felony for
which no arrest is made

40,33881

40,33882

983

984

Avoidance of daily cost of
monitoring released
individual

Estimating the economic benefit of pretrial detention involves two steps.
First, I model the probability that a defendant commits a particular felony
during pretrial release as a function of the category of original arrest
(violent crime, property crime, drug crime, or public order crime),
defendant age, year of arrest, and prior criminal record. Second, I multiply
the probability of re-arrest by the benefits listed in Table 2. This procedure
assigns each defendant from the BJS data a monetary value that reflects the
expected economic benefit of pretrial detention. Below, I briefly summarize
and present the results for each step.
As the first step in determining the costs imposed if a released detainee
commits a crime, I model the probability of a defendant i committing a
particular felony f in year t in county c as follows:
𝑓!"# = 𝛼! + 𝑋!"# 𝛽 + 𝑍!" 𝛾 + 𝜖!"#
where 𝑋!"# are a defendant’s observed characteristics, 𝑍!" are county
characteristics, and 𝜖!"# is an unobserved error term. Using standard probit
regressions, I then estimate the model for each of the sixteen felonies
reported in Table 2.85 This assigns each defendant an unobserved index
value that reflects the likelihood of arrest during pretrial release. Defendants
actually arrested for a particular felony are assigned a positive value, while
those not rearrested receive a negative value. I convert these values into
probabilities by maximizing the log of:
81

Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 26, at 768.
Id.
83
Buddress, supra note 30, at 5. This figure is found by dividing the yearly
supervision cost per year ($2,344) by 365, and adjusting for inflation to reflect the value of
2014 dollars. Id.
84
Id.
85
Results from the sixteen probit regression models and descriptive statistics for
predictor variables are presented in appendix A.
82
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!

𝑃(𝑓!"# > 0)!!"# 𝑃(𝑓!"# ≤ 0)!!!!"#
!!!

Figure 1 below displays the results of these calculations. These
calculations are striking in the sense that they contravene the average
individual’s estimations about the frequency of re-offense post-release.
While an individual arrested for a felony and then released may well be
more likely than a non-arrested individual to commit a crime, the
probability of re-arrest for a new felony during pretrial release is actually
relatively low. On average, a defendant on pretrial release has only an
11.36% chance of being rearrested for a felony. Only 3.43% of all
defendants are more than 26% likely to be rearrested while on release, while
nearly 90% of all defendants are less than 20% likely to be rearrested postrelease.
Figure 1. Probability of Re-arrest if Released

29.59%
22.91%

22.19%

14.88%

6.99%
3.43%

5% or Less

6 to 10%

11 to 15%

16 to 20%

21 to 25% 26% or more

The calculations presented in conjunction with Figure 1 above reveal a
point crucial to my analysis: speaking in general terms, the relative cost of
releasing some defendants is actually greater than the cost of detaining
those defendants; the converse is also true for other subsets of defendants.
The next step, then, is to derive a formula that will determine the
economic benefit of pretrial detention for each individual defendant. I
14
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accomplish this by multiplying the probability of re-arrest by the economic
savings associated with avoiding the felonies reported in Table 2. The total
benefit b for preventing person i living in year t and county c from
committing felony f is:
𝑏!"# =

𝑃!"# 𝑓$

where f$ represents the economic savings in 2014 dollars of avoiding felony
f.
Of course, felonies-avoided is only one category of cost savings that this
analysis must account for. Using the same two procedures described above,
I also calculate the economic savings associated with avoiding a
defendant’s failure to appear in court and avoiding felonies for which no
arrest is made. The total economic benefits, represented as S, through
detaining a particular defendant is given by
!

𝑆!"# =

!

𝑏!"# +
!!!

𝑙!"# + 9𝑑!"#
!!!

where l represents the benefit of avoiding failures to appear and felonies for
which there is no arrest, and d represents the number of days between arrest
and adjudication. This formula will later prove useful in estimating the costs
potentially avoided through cost-benefit analysis.
Overall, this Part demonstrates that the relative cost of releasing some
defendants is actually greater than the cost of detaining them, but that
releasing some defendants allows substantial savings. And by using
information on which defendants are safe to release, judges can make more
informed decisions pretrial.
B. Estimating the Costs of Pretrial Detention
The converse of the benefits of pretrial release are the costs imposed
when judges decide to continue to detain a pretrial detainee. There are a
number of direct and indirect economic costs inherent in continuing to
detain a defendant pretrial. These include loss of freedom, income, and
housing, childcare costs, stolen/lost property, strain on intimate
relationships, potential violent or sexual assault, prison operation, loss of
federal and local tax revenue, and welfare benefits paid to a detainee’s
family. I again rely on external sources to estimate each of these costs,
which are presented in Table 3 below. Each source’s estimate has been
15
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converted into a per-day detainment cost. Additionally, some sources
reported only a single, general-level economic figure, while others provided
estimates for specific years or geographic areas. When possible, I adjusted
the cost estimates for each individual defendant’s geographic location and
year of arrest. The last column of Table 3 shows these calculations, where y,
represents a year-specific adjustment, and a, is an area-specific adjustment.
The total cost of detainment (E) for a given person i in year t living in
county c is
!

𝐸!"# =

𝑒! 𝑦! 𝑎! 𝑑!
!!!

where d is the number of days between arrest and adjudication.
Table 3. Economic Costs of Detention86
Description	
  
Key figure(s)
Expense ($) Calculation  for  person  i  
Individual Costs  
Loss of
Typical defendant ~$11 per day
$1,036
𝑒
=
𝑑!   
!
freedom
willing to pay
($1,036/90)
90
$1,036 for 90 days
  
of freedom87
Loss of
Mean U.S. county ~$85 per day
$31,028
𝑒
=
𝑦! 𝑎! 𝑑!   
!
income
per capita income
($31,028/
365
is approximately
365)
$31,02888
Loss of
23% of
~$2,748 if
𝑒! = $1,565𝑚!   
housing
misdemeanants
detained 60+
forfeit $1,565 in
days
lost and new
deposits89

86

The dollar values have been adjusted for inflation to reflect the value of 2014
dollars. The variable m takes on a value of 1 if a defendant has been detained for greater
than 60 days and zero otherwise.
87
Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 26, at 750–51.
88
State & County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2015, 11:15 AM).
89
Pogrebin, et al., supra note 19.
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Childcare
costs

Stolen or lost
property

Strain on
intimate
relationships
Possibility of
violent or
sexual assault

Families earning
under $56,670
spend $1,938 per
year in childcare
costs for children
five and under; 90
a majority of
inmates have
minor children91
Approximately
one out of three
inmates have
property stolen; 92
larceny costs $580
per incident93
Marriage is worth
$103,670 per
year; 94 17% of
federal inmates
are married95
4.43.2% of prison
and 3.1% of jail
inmates report one
or more incidents
of sexual
victimization; 96

~$5 per day
($1,938/
365)

~$193 per
incident (if
detained 60+
days)
($580/3)

𝑒! =

$1,938
𝑑!   
365

𝑒! =

$580
𝑚!   
3

~$84 per day 𝑒!
(($103,670)(.
$103,670 . 26
=
26))/365
365
~$11 per day 𝑒!
(($136,191
$136,191 . 032
(.032))/365 =
365

90

𝑑!   

𝑑!   

MARK LINO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES,
2010 26 tbl.1 (2011).
91
LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA N. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2008).
92
ROY D. KING & KATHLEEN MCDERMOTT, THE STATE OF OUR PRISONS 119 (1995).
93
MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
94
David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-being Over Time in Britain and
the USA, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1359, 1381 (2004).
95
GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 91, at 21 app. tbl.16. (Since 201,600 out of
1,226,200 state inmates are married and 33,600 out of 129,300 federal inmates are married,
thus, the total married is 235,200 out of 1,355,500 for a percentage of 17.35%).
96
BECK ET AL., supra note 24, at 5 (An estimated 4.4% of prison inmates and 3.1% of
jail inmates reported experiencing one or more incidents of sexual victimization by another
inmate or facility staff in the past 12 months or since admission to the facility, if less than
12 months.)
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rape costs
$136,191 per
incident97
Public Costs  
Prison
Mean U.S. state
~$83 per day
operation cost of inmate
($31,406/
costs
detainment is
365)
$31,40698
Loss of federal Annual federal tax ~$19 per day
tax
revenue reduced
($5,142/365)
by $5,142 per
incarceration99
Loss of state Annual state tax
~$3 per day
tax
revenue reduced
($1,249/365)
by $1,249 per
incarceration100
Welfare for Typical family of ~$30 per day
detainee’s incarcerated
($8,293/365)
family
person receives
$8,293 per year in
welfare benefits101

𝑒! =

$31,406
𝑎! 𝑑!   
365

𝑒! =

$5,142
𝑑!   
365

𝑒! =

$1,249
𝑑!   
365

𝑒! =

$8,293
𝑑!   
365

Figure 2 below incorporates these calculations to display the average
estimated direct cost resulting from a decision to detain or release a
defendant before trial. In conjunction with Figure 1 above, these
calculations show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the economic costs of
pretrial detention typically exceed the costs imposed by pretrial release.
Specifically, the average cost of detention exceeds the cost of release by
approximately $20,000; detaining a defendant, on average, results in

97

MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.
STEPHAN, supra note 15, at 1.
99
Buddress, supra note 30, at 10.
100
Id.
101
Id.
98
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$40,300 in direct costs, while the mean cost of releasing a defendant pretrial
is just $19,500.
Figure 2. Mean Cost of Release and Detention

Felonies estimated less costly

Middle

Felonies estimated more costly

$40,300
$19,500

Mean Direct Cost of Release
for SPCS Cases (n=132,865)

Mean Direct Cost of
Detention for SPCS Cases
(n=132,865)

Of course, these calculations are merely the result in the average case—
and theoretical results, at that. Figure 3, below, puts theory into practice by
displaying the estimated direct cost of pretrial release and detention in
actual judicial pretrial detention and release decisions. Out of 132,865
defendants, 62% were released, while the remaining 38% were detained.102
Importantly, the reported data presented in Figure 3 mirror the data
presented in Figure 2 above; pretrial release resulted in an average direct
cost of $18,014 compared to an average cost of $29,700 for pretrial
detention.

102

COHEN & REAVES, supra note 40, at 1–2.
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Figure 3. Direct Cost Differentials Between Released and Detained
SCPS Cases
Felonies estimated less costly

Middle

Felonies estimated more costly
$29,700

$18,014

Mean Cost per Released
Case in SCPS (n=82,468)

Mean Cost per Detained
Cased in SCPS (n=50,397)

C. Net Economic Benefit of Pretrial Release
The cost calculations set forth above mean that pretrial release is,
accounting for all costs and benefits, often less expensive than pretrial
detention, and suggest that judges would do best to release defendants
pretrial more often than detain. To complete the analysis, however, one
must also account for the benefits of avoiding costs associated with pretrial
detention. If the cost of releasing a defendant, including the cost of any
crimes committed during release, exceeds the cost of detention, releasing
the defendant fails to produce a net economic benefit. Similarly, if the cost
of detention exceeds the cost of release, detaining the defendant pretrial
fails to produce a net economic benefit. Table 4 below presents a
hypothetical representations of the four possible net benefit scenarios of
pretrial detention decisions: detain with negative net benefit; detain with
positive net benefit; release with negative net benefit; and release with
positive net benefit.

20

Forthcoming in BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017
Table 4. Net Benefit Scenarios
Net
Benefit
Formula
($)	
  

Scenario

Detained
or
Released?

Cost of
Detention
($)	
  

Cost of
Release
($)	
  

Net
Benefit
($)	
  

A

Detained

25,000	
  

20,000	
  

20,000 25,000	
  

- 5,000	
  

B

Detained

25,000	
  

30,000	
  

30,000 25,000	
  

+ 5,000	
  

C

Released

25,000	
  

30,000	
  

25,000 30,000	
  

- 5,000	
  

D

Released

25,000	
  

20,000	
  

25,000 20,000	
  

+ 5,000	
  

Using the cost and benefit calculations from the previous two
subsections, it is possible to measure the expected net benefit associated
with the decision to release or detain each defendant in the BJS data. To
calculate the net benefit of release, I subtract the expected benefit of release
from the expected cost of detainment. The decision to release a defendant
produces a net economic benefit if the costs imposed on society of releasing
the defendant do not exceed the expected cost of detainment. The net
benefit formula for release is therefore
𝑁!"# = 𝐸!"# − 𝑆!"#
where N is the net benefit, E is the economic cost of detention, and S is the
benefit (i.e., avoided cost of release) for each defendant in the sample.
For defendants detained pretrial, the formula is simply reversed. That is,
a judge’s decision not to release a defendant pretrial produces a net benefit
if the avoided cost of release (i.e. monitoring, crime, failure to appear, etc.)
exceeds the expense of detainment.
𝑁!"# = 𝑆!"# − 𝐸!"#
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The analysis that follows reports three different net benefit calculations
in three different scenarios: (1) the net benefit of judges’ actual pretrial
detention decisions between 1990 and 2006; (2) the net benefit if all judges
had released every defendant; and (3) the net benefit if judges had detained
every defendant. Recall that Table 2 above reported a range of costs
associated with each of sixteen felonies: a low estimate, a high estimate,
and an average estimate. Figure 4 below presents each of those estimates in
the three alternate scenarios.
Figure 4. Net Benefit Scenarios
Felonies estimated less costly
$29,357

Middle

Felonies estimated more costly

$20,801
-$20,801

-$6,772

$15,665

Net Benefit per Net Benefit per Net benefit if Net Benefit if
Actual Net
Released SCPS Detained SCPS All SCPS Cases All SCPS Cases Benefit per
Case (n=82,468)Case (n=50,397)
Released
Detained
SCPS Case
(n=132,865)
(n=132,865)
(n=132,865)

Note that the actual decisions in practice produced a net benefit per
defendant of around $15,664 but that the actual decisions to detain
defendants produced a $6,771 loss on average. Compared to the actual
benefits achieved, a policy of universal pretrial release would have
produced approximately $5,000 in economic savings per defendant. Thus,
even a universal pretrial release regime is better than the current system, at
least as far as costs and benefits are concerned.
Of course, universal release is neither feasible nor the optimal policy
from an efficiency standpoint as crime rates could potentially increase.
Table 5 shows that 50% of all pretrial detentions produced an economic
benefit, while around 20% of pretrial releases resulted in an economic loss.
This result has broader implications for cost-benefit analysis in pretrial
detention decisionmaking; that is, systematically fine tuning pretrial
22
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detention decisions through cost-benefit analysis could result in significant
economic savings to society.

Table 5. Net Benefit by Release or Detention
% with Net
Benefit

Benefit in $	
  

% with Net
Loss	
  

Loss in $	
  

Released
(n=82,468)

80.2	
  

40,483	
  

19.8	
  

15,525	
  

Detained
(n=50,397)

50.0	
  

16,699	
  

50.0	
  

30,208	
  

Category

The critical task, then, is to identify those defendants for whom pretrial
detention produces a net benefit. That task may be accomplished by finding
subsets of defendants who share common characteristics that could lead to a
general framework for making cost-benefit calculations in pretrial detention
decisions. If these defendants share common characteristics that differ
systematically from defendants for whom pretrial detention produces a net
loss, then judges could use criteria backed by empirical data in order to
promote more efficient and equitable decisions.
Figure 5 represents a first step in this direction. It displays the net
benefit of pretrial detention for each defendant in the BJS data in order of
lowest net benefit to highest. Note that 31% of all defendants would
produce a net benefit if detained. This figure is seven percentage points
lower than the 38% of defendants judges actually detained.103 It likewise
takes a substantially more middle ground approach: a 31% detention rate is
a far more conservative, feasible, and preferable approach to a policy of
universal release.

103

COHEN & REAVES, supra note 40, at 2.
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Figure 5. Net Benefits of Detention by Percentile

Clearly, an optimal pretrial detention policy would detain only those
individuals for whom detention will on average produce a net benefit to
society. Figure 6 shows the significant savings of such a policy compared to
actual pretrial detention decisions and universal release. Note that the net
benefit per defendant in the optimal scenario is almost $30,000, which
represents savings of approximately $10,000 per defendant under universal
release and approximately $15,000 compared to judges’ actual pretrial
detention decisions.
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Figure 6. Direct Cost and Net Benefit of Release of SCPS Cases
Direct Cost

Net Benefit
$30,953

$22,068

$19,499 $20,065
$15,665

Per Actual SCPS Case

$14,424

If All SCPS Cases Released

If Only + Net Benefit
SCPS Cases Detained

To determine the characteristics that best predict criminal behavior
during release, I model the expected net benefit of detention as a function of
the category of a defendant’s original arrest (i.e. violent, property, drugrelated, or public order), age, year, prior criminal history, and geographic
location. Thus, the economic benefits b of detaining person i in year t living
in county c are determined by
log  𝑏!"# = 𝛼! + 𝑋!"# 𝛽 + 𝑍!" 𝛾 + 𝜖!"#
where X are a defendant’s observed characteristics, Z are county
characteristics, and 𝜖 is an unobserved error term.104 Using the BJS data, I
estimate the model using an ordinary-least squares regression, the results of
which are reported in Table 6 below.

104

The net benefits variable has undergone a log transformation because it was not
normally distributed. Taking the natural log of net benefits more accurately reflects the
relationship between the net benefits of detention and the predictor variables.
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Table 6. Log of Benefits List Regressed on Predictor Variables105
Variable
Coefficient
Standard Error	
  
Type of original crime
Violent
--Property
-0.818***
0.003
Drug
-0.651***
0.007
Public Order
-0.674***
0.004
Prior arrests
None
One

--

--

-0.246***

0.007

Two or Three
Four or more
Prior Incarceration
Multiple Charges
Prior Failure to Appear

-0.128***
0.622***
0.314***
-0.131***
0.434***

0.013
0.005
0.002
0.004
0.005

Active Criminal Justice Status
Felon
Age

0.454***
-0.162***

0.004
0.004

19 or less

--

--

20 to 24

-0.559***

0.004

25 to 29

-1.287***

0.009

30 to39

-1.605***

0.011

40 to 49
50 or more
Constant

-2.324***
-1.850***
9.559***

0.018
0.008
0.082

Year Dummies

YES

County Characteristic Controls

YES 132,865

105

See Appendix A for year and county coefficients. Note that N =132,865. Note that
*** denotes a coefficient is statistically significant at the p ≤ .001 level.
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Critically, the course of this regression analysis reveals six defendantspecific factors with the greatest influence on the net benefit derived from
detention in a particular case: (1) original arrest for a violent crime, (2) four
or more prior arrests, (3) prior incarceration, (4) a prior failure to appear, (5)
an active criminal justice status, and (6) aged nineteen or younger. These
six characteristics, then, are those that have the potential to be the most
useful in making cost-benefit calculations for pretrial detention decisions.
The analysis also demonstrates that releasing an individual with any one
of these six characteristics results in the direct costs of $159,519. Yet,
judges released 30% of defendants with these characteristics.106 Conversely,
releasing individuals who possess none of these characteristics results in an
average cost of $4,181 per defendant. Yet, judges detained 18.6% of these
defendants.107
The impacts of these variables on the net benefits of detention are
striking and substantial. On average, detaining a defendant with four or
more prior arrests produces a net benefit 82% higher than detaining a
defendant with no prior history. Likewise, detaining a defendant who has
either a prior incarceration or a prior failure to appear produces net benefits
37% and 54% higher, respectively, than defendants with neither. Finally,
detention of a defendant with active criminal justice status produces net
benefit 57% higher than detention of a defendant without active status. With
respect to the type of offense, detaining a defendant arrested for a violent
crime produces average net benefits 44% higher than a defendant arrested
for a property crime, 52% higher than a defendant arrested for a drug crime,
and 51% higher than defendants arrested for public order crimes.108 It thus
seems that a middle-ground approach to pretrial detention, in which judges
decide to release some offenders and detain others based on statistical risk,
is economically preferable to any system of universal release or detention.
The middle-ground approach is likewise preferable to the current pretrial
detention system.

106

COHEN & REAVES, supra note 40. This is not to say that judges should detain all
defendants under the age of 19, regardless of their prior criminal history.
107
Id.
108
See J.M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH
636 (2009).
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Given the sheer number of felony arrests per year,109 pretrial detention
policies that incorporate judicial consideration of these characteristics could
save billions of dollars per year. For example, Figure 7 below shows how
accounting for some of the characteristics identified in Table 6 could result
in significant savings. Even a simple policy, such as universally detaining
any defendant under the age of twenty-four who was arrested for a violent
felony and releasing all others, produces a higher net benefit than either a
universal release policy or judges’ actual detention decisions. Such a policy
saves an average of $7,624 per defendant relative to judges’ actual
detention decisions and $1,341 compared to universal release.110 Note that
these savings would accrue despite employing a detainment rate that is
twenty-eight percentage points lower than the actual detention rate.111
Figure 7. Direct Cost and Net Benefit of Detainment Violent Felony
Arrests, Age 24 or Less

Direct Cost
$21,832

Net Benefit

$19,499

$18,019
$10,416

$11,757

$4,133

Per SCPS Detainment/ If All SCPS Cases Released If Only Violent Felony
Release (38% of Cases
(0% of Cases Detained) Arrestees Age 24 or Less
Detained)
Detained (10% of Cases
Detained)

109

See generally HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1990-2010 (2012) (reporting detailed statistics and information about the
number of arrests in the United States from 1990 to 2010).
110
COHEN & REAVES, supra note 40.
111
Id.
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Multiplying the economic savings per defendant calculated in Figure 7
by the number of felony arrests in America112 yields savings of $78 billion
compared to current policies and $14 billion compared to universal release.
Clearly, the dollar net savings realized from utilizing this cost-benefit
approach are substantial. Yet a look beneath the bottom line reveals
something far more interesting. The reason why such an amount can be
saved is because, at least in the context of pretrial detention decisions, it is
statistically more costly to detain some defendants than it would be to
release them, and vice versa. As explained above, the balancing test in
which judges engage in making pretrial detention or release decisions
requires judges to weigh a detainee’s liberty interest against the risk of the
detainee committing a crime while freed on bail. This implies that judges
take into account the nature of the crime for which a detainee is accused,
because the risk of releasing a detainee accused of, say, murder, is probably
greater than the risk incurred for releasing an individual accused of a
nonviolent crime, such as property damage or petty larceny.
This cost-benefit analysis took these necessarily vague and indefinite
risk calculations, and attached quantified costs incurred and avoided for the
detention of specific subsets of detainees. The main takeaways from this
Article are as follows. First, there are ways for judges to know which
defendants are more likely to pose a threat pretrial.113 Second, this analysis
shows not merely that release of pretrial detainees is less costly overall, but
that it is more cost effective to release some and detain others. Specifically,
it is more cost effective to detain individuals who pose a violent crime risk
because of the costs imposed if these individuals commit crimes similar to
those for which they are accused while on bail. Conversely, it is more cost
effective to release nonviolent detainees because the costs to the individual
and society are significantly lower if these individuals commit similar
crimes while on bail. Finally, the reason why cost-benefit analysis may
result in substantial savings to society comes from classifying pretrial
detainees into subsets, aggregating costs associated with detention or
release, and allowing judges to render decisions accordingly.
III. LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

112

SNYDER, supra note 109, at 2 tbl.1.
See also Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 7, at 557–58 (discussing the most
common predictive factors of pretrial crime that judges should be mindful of).
113
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In the pretrial arena, cost-benefit analysis may prove to be an effective
tool to help judges rationally decide whether economics support releasing or
detaining defendants pretrial. My goal has been to identify what benefits
and costs are implicit in both decisions and to discover a means of
accomplishing this analysis for the ultimate benefit of society. There are
certainly limitations with this approach. I suggest that, despite the
limitations discussed below, a cost-based pretrial detention method is, if not
necessarily the best approach, an important consideration for legislative
policy and judicial evaluation for pretrial detention.
A. Impact of Latent Variables on Estimates
The analysis detailed above relies on the assumption that, in data
collected by the BJS, judges did not rely on any characteristics of the
defendants or the crime they were accused of that were not subsequently
collected by the survey. To the extent that judges used unreported
information available to them to correctly detain defendants of greater
hazard to the community, the cost benefit calculations in this Article will be
incorrect. To use an extreme hypothetical: if all of the defendants actually
detained would have committed murder had they been released prior to
trial, and the judge detained them because of unreported knowledge (i.e.
perhaps they made threats at a hearing), then the decision making
framework suggested in this Article vastly overestimates the hypothetical
benefit of releasing such defendants.
Because some jurisdictions have a much higher rate of pretrial detention
than others for similar crimes, it’s unlikely that latent variables have played
a significant, systematic role in judicial decisionmaking. Creating
decisionmaking criteria that do not suffer from latent variable bias would
require collecting data from defendants whose pretrial detention decision
was made without any judicial discretion whatsoever. This could be
accomplished if a jurisdiction adopted a universal release policy, randomly
released half of all defendants, or used some other explicit heuristic such as
the one suggested earlier in this Article.
B. Impact of Release Conditions on Analysis
This analysis does not explicitly consider the conditions of release.
Simplifying the release choice into a simple choice of release-or-detain
simplified the data collection and analysis, but may not reflect the reality of
practice. Release conditions might include house arrest, an anklet
monitoring system, or a restraining order. The use of such conditions may
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have substantially decreased the rate of criminal acts by defendants that
were released. One could imagine a pretrial release granted with severe
restrictions on interaction with the public, including a house arrest, an ankle
tracking system, and an injunction against using communication technology
such as the telephone or internet. Given that such restrictions on freedoms
may have significantly reduced the rate of criminal activity perpetrated by
defendants in the past, it would be inappropriate to conclude from this
analysis that heuristics suggesting release should necessarily be without
such restrictions in the future.
C. Impact of Explicit Heuristic Release Criteria on Charging and Plea
Bargaining
Currently, prosecutors have extensive discretion in choosing what
charges to bring against a defendant, and judges have discretion to
determine pretrial detention based on the charges brought as well as the
circumstances as presented to them by the prosecutor. To the extent that a
district adopted heuristics for pretrial detention based on the crime charged,
prosecutors might alter their choice of charges brought to influence or fix
the pretrial detention determination. Similarly, the presence of explicit
formula in determining pretrial detention decisions might influence
defendants to be more willing to accept a plea bargain if they knew they
were going to be detained, much in the same way that child support
formulas have decreased litigation in the family law context.114 Conversely,
those defendants who knew that they would not be detained based on a
formula might be less likely to accept a plea bargain if it meant they would
have to immediately forfeit their freedom.
CONCLUSION
This nation spends billions of dollars detaining roughly half a million
suspects pretrial on any given day.115 While these detentions are arguably
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constitutionally and morally suspect, this Article focused on the costs
incurred on society and to the defendant to detain this group of individuals.
While local, state, and national governments have all lamented the costs
incurred by incarceration, this Article provides the first cost-benefit analysis
of the pretrial detention decision. It considers the risk of crime posed by
each group of defendant and proportionately compares this to the number
and type of defendant released. It then considers the costs to the defendant
of being detained and to society, but also the costs of releasing defendants,
including consideration of the crimes these defendants may commit. While
much legal scholarship has advocated for cost-benefit analysis in other
areas of criminal law, little work has been done to investigate whether and
how the same could be accomplished in pretrial detention decisions.
Utilizing recent existing research and my own research, I have calculated
the benefits and costs, both primary/secondary and direct/indirect, of
pretrial detention. I also calculated the net benefits and costs of pretrial
detention decisions in actual cases, with some important ramifications.
The primary finding of this Article is that systematically fine tuning
pretrial detention decisions through cost-benefit analysis could result in
billions of dollars of economic savings to society, compared to current
policies. Using explicit heuristics to guide their decisions, judges can
release significantly more defendants without increased economic or social
costs. The model suggests that only 50% of all pretrial detentions produced
an economic benefit, while a mere 20% of pretrial releases resulted in an
economic loss. Like any human decision maker, judges cannot make good
choices without having quantified estimates of the risks and benefits of the
options before them. In addition to providing those estimates, this Article
has suggested a simple detention heuristic based on readily identifiable
defendant-specific factors.116
This analysis contains admitted weaknesses and limitations. As with all
cost-benefit analyses, quantifying the costs incurred and saved is
necessarily easier on paper than implementing them in real life. It is
impractical to control for all potential factors in conducting such an
analysis. For instance, putting temporal limitations on a particular analysis
is bound to be uncertain, as the effect of costs on an individual or on society
will inevitably shift alongside changing circumstances. It is likewise nigh
impossible to anticipate the secondary effects of a proposed policy, the
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occurrence of which could change the outcome of the analysis significantly.
Even monetizing direct costs and benefits is a potentially perilous endeavor
given the sheer amount of the data available. But even if there was a way to
conduct a perfect analysis, this Article does not ignore the inherent
undemocratic nature of cost-benefit analysis and the potential pitfalls
surrounding that.
And indeed, nothing in this Article is intended to argue against the
relative importance of constitutional rights or equity, fairness, and justice—
all arguments that pose valid critiques of cost-benefit analysis. Rather, this
Article claims that, while no perfect solution exists, when implemented
correctly, cost-benefit analysis can at least inform judicial decisionmaking
in the pretrial process. And despite its empirical limitations, the cost-benefit
analysis provided here could allow judges to release more defendants (while
maintaining or lowering crime rates), and save this country a substantial
amount of money.
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